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This article addresses a number of issues regarding post-sentence detention 
order regimes in the context of an analysis of a collection of publicly 
available judgments made under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual 
Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld). The article raises concerns regarding the 
accuracy of the psychiatric evidence presented to the court. However, it 
suggests that the way in which the psychiatrists conduct their prisoner 
assessments, and the way in which judges have applied the main rules of 
expert evidence, have combined to ensure that the potential for unjust 
outcomes has been minimised. The article also suggests that judges have 
struck a fine balance between community protection and prisoner liberty, by 
in most cases making supervision orders which allow prisoners to be 
released into the community under strict conditions, rather than making 
detention orders. As no prisoner released under a supervision order is 
known to have committed a further sex offence, it is the conclusion of this 
article that the judges’ approach to cases under the Dangerous Prisoners 
(Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) has been highly successful, and may 
represent a solution to the serious problem of recidivist sex offenders within 
the community. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
Nothing seems to incite anger within the community quite like the 
prospective release from prison of a sex offender, particularly one who has 
taken children as his victims. His prison term is nearly always considered 
unjustly lenient, and his release is more often than not viewed by the 
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community as merely an invitation for him to continue his criminal course of 
conduct. In recent years, media scrutiny of sex offender cases, and public 
hysteria surrounding predatory sex offenders within the community, has 
increased to the extent that, according to criminologist Dr Stephen 
Smallbone, ‘there’s no doubt at all that we are in the midst of a so-called 
moral panic, particularly with respect to sexual offences’.
1
  
 
In response to the growing public outcry, governments across Australia have 
enacted an increasing amount of legislation aimed at protecting the 
community from the threat of sex offenders.
2
 Importantly, the primary focus 
of this legislation has been on preventing recidivism through initiatives such 
as sex offender registers, rather than trying to reduce the number of primary 
offences that are committed. But, in trying to design measures to ensure 
public safety, policy makers have faced a serious dilemma. As outlined by Dr 
Karen Gelb,  
 
[a]t the heart of the dilemma is a balancing exercise – between the 
community’s right to safety and … to be protected from convicted offenders 
who are … at high-risk of committing further serious crimes, and the rights 
of offenders who have served their sentence to be free from further 
confinement…
3
 
 
In 2003, the Queensland Parliament appeared to tip this balance away from 
the long-held presumption in favour of an offender’s right to unfettered 
liberty following the expiration of his sentence. The result was perhaps the 
most radical sex offender legislation ever to be passed in this country, the 
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) (DP(SO)A). 
 
In order to ‘ensure adequate protection of the community’,
4
 the DP(SO)A 
empowers the State’s Attorney-General to apply to the Supreme Court for an 
order enabling the indefinite detention of a prisoner who is within six months 
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of serving the full term of his imprisonment for a serious sexual offence.
5
 For 
the purposes of the Act, a serious sexual offence is defined in the Schedule as 
one of a sexual nature, involving violence or against children.
6
 Section 13 of 
the DP(SO)A provides that, should the court be satisfied that the prisoner 
poses a ‘serious danger to the community’,
7
 it may make an indefinite 
detention order for the care, control or treatment of the prisoner, or a 
supervision order under which the prisoner is released subject to certain 
conditions.
8
 These conditions, contained in section 16, require that the 
prisoner— 
 
(a) report to a corrective services officer at the place, and within the time, 
stated in the order and advise the officer of the prisoner’s current name 
and address; and 
 
(b) report to, and receive visits from, a corrective services officer as directed 
by the judicial authority; and 
 
(c) notify a corrective services officer of every change of the prisoner’s name, 
place of residence or employment at least 2 business days before the 
change happens; and 
 
(d) be under the supervision of a corrective services officer; and 
 
(e) not leave or stay out of Queensland without the permission of a corrective 
services officer; and 
 
(f) not commit an offence of a sexual nature during the period of the order.
9
 
 
The court may also place any additional conditions upon the prisoner that it 
feels are necessary to ensure that the prisoner does not re-offend upon 
release.
10
 
 
In deciding whether the prisoner poses a serious danger to the community, 
the court must determine whether there is an ‘unacceptable risk’ of the 
prisoner committing a serious sexual offence should they be released from 
custody without supervision.
11
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By introducing post-sentence protection orders to the repertoire of judicial 
powers, the DP(SO)A has required judges to adopt a wholly new style of 
decision making, one seemingly at odds with judicial traditions in this 
country. True it is that the ‘ultimate justification for criminal sanctions is the 
protection of society from … conduct which the law proscribes’,
12
 and 
sentencing legislation includes protection of the community from the 
offender as a legitimate purpose of sentencing.
13
 However, Australian judges 
have not historically been empowered to imprison a person unless that person 
has been convicted of a criminal offence, regardless of the danger they may 
pose to society. Even those most serious sentencing options, such as 
indefinite detention, which are applied to those with involved criminal 
histories and for which community protection is of paramount concern, are 
connected to a contemporary offence. In contrast to this, the DP(SO)A asks 
judges to consider detaining prisoners, not so that they may be punished 
further, but for the sole purpose of protecting the community, and based 
entirely upon an assessment of their likelihood of future re-offending.  
 
A Purpose and Outline 
 
The purpose of this article is to investigate the way in which judges of the 
Queensland Supreme Court and Court of Appeal have responded to the task 
of making decisions of this nature, and to identify any significant trends in 
their decision making.   
 
While not the focus of this article, it is important to note that there has been 
significant controversy surrounding the DP(SO)A and the increasing spread 
of post-sentence protection order regimes generally.  
 
This is for a number of reasons, the first of which is that the DP(SO)A is seen 
by some as an example of an increasing trend within Australian jurisdictions 
to impose sanctions against people not because of what they have done, but 
because of who they are, and what they might do in the future. Such policies 
are often justified as being integral to the protection of the community from 
its most dangerous elements. However, there has been concern that the 
DP(SO)A and other preventive measures are merely an attempt by 
governments to capitalise politically on the heightened state of fear and 
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uncertainty with regard to issues of security that has existed within Australia 
in recent times.
14
      
 
Secondly, the political climate described above has resulted in a legislative 
backlash against those fundamental legal principles that have for a long time 
acted as a bulwark for individuals against the excesses of government. 
Despite the High Court’s opinion to the contrary, there has been support for 
the view that the DP(SO)A offends a number of such principles, including the 
rule of law and the principle against double punishment.
15
  
 
Thirdly, it has been argued that the failure of the DP(SO)A to uphold the 
principle of double punishment is in breach of international law, insofar as it 
contravenes the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ 
provision against double jeopardy.
16
 This is not surprising, considering the 
tendency of Australian governments, particularly during the last decade, to 
disregard international institutions and instruments when formulating policy.  
 
Be it to enhance community protection or for more cynical reasons, the New 
South Wales and Western Australian governments both rushed to enact post-
sentence protection order legislation of their own soon after the High Court’s 
declaration of the DP(SO)A’s constitutional validity.
17
 However, whatever 
the motives of government, Professor Bernadette McSherry maintains that 
the reason why legislation such as the DP(SO)A is so popular within the 
community is that it caters to people’s tendency to ‘to focus on the worst-case 
scenarios rather than the probability of such scenarios occurring’.
18
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For now, the policy decision as to whether there should be such an Act has 
been decided by the Queensland Parliament, and this article will not rehearse 
the general policy debates behind the legislation's desirability. Nonetheless, 
developing an understanding of how the Act is actually performing and the 
outcomes being achieved through its operation may yield a better sense of its 
true moral character. In order to achieve this, the article is structured in 
accordance with the following outline:     
 
Part II of the article explains the relevant features of the DP(SO)A, its 
constitutionality, and the way in which post-sentence protection order 
legislation has evolved since its introduction;  
 
Part III analyses judicial treatment of expert psychiatric evidence under the 
DP(SO)A, which is of particular importance to the operation of the Act;  
 
Part IV outlines how the judiciary has sought to resolve the inevitable 
conflict between the competing imperatives of community protection and 
prisoner liberty that arises under the Act;  
 
Finally, Part V underlines some of the lessons to be learnt from the 
Queensland experience, with reference to the recommendations of the 
Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council, which has recently recommended 
against the introduction of post-sentence preventive detention in that State.
19
   
 
B Methodology 
 
In preparation for this article, all publicly available judgments made under 
the DP(SO)A between the Act’s introduction in 2003, and 12 July 2007, were 
analysed.
20
 In total, 54 judgments from a variety of proceedings heard under 
the Act were located, including originating applications, determinations of 
orders, annual detention order reviews, as well as appeals. These judgments 
are listed in the Appendix. The collection appears not to be exhaustive, as the 
judgments often make reference to past or future hearings for which no 
record could be located. Nonetheless, the collection was sufficient for the 
purposes of identifying trends in judicial decision making, the results of 
which have not, to the knowledge of the author, been published previously. 
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In the context of the debate regarding the efficacy of post-sentence protection 
order regimes, this analysis is an important exercise, as Western Australia 
and New South Wales have already followed Queensland’s lead and enacted 
legislation similar in character to the DP(SO)A. Considering the political 
traction governments generally achieve through ‘tough on crime’ policies, it 
is not unreasonable to suggest that such regimes will be expanded in their 
application to include offences beyond those that are sexual in nature. 
 
C Results 
 
As will be seen, this article indicates that Queensland judges have been 
somewhat reluctant to grant indefinite detention orders, having made only 
eight within the period of analysis. On the other hand, 30 supervision orders 
had been granted.
21
 However, the judges’ use of expert psychiatric evidence 
to identify those environmental factors and risk behaviours that are most 
likely to result in a prisoner re-offending upon release, in order to develop 
specifically targeted supervision orders, has proved highly successful. In fact, 
while supervision orders have been breached on a number of occasions, at the 
time that this article was written, no prisoner released under a supervision 
order had been known to commit a further serious sexual offence. By not 
granting a large number of detention orders, it is certainly possible that the 
judges have not acted in the manner contemplated by the Queensland 
Government when it introduced the DP(SO)A, but it could be that judges 
have discovered a way to reduce the harmful impact of recidivist sex 
offenders upon the community. What is remarkable is that they have done so 
while at the same time minimising the seemingly inevitable erosion of one of 
the fundamental civil liberties enjoyed by individuals in this country.    
 
 
II THE DP(SO)A, ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY, AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF AUSTRALIAN POST-SENTENCE 
PREVENTIVE DETENTION LEGISLATION 
 
A Relevant Features of the DP(SO)A 
 
It is first necessary to outline those features of the DP(SO)A relevant to this 
article.  
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When deciding whether to make either a detention order or supervision order, 
the court’s decision must be based on the reception of acceptable, cogent 
evidence.
22
 The court must also be satisfied, to a high degree of probability, 
that its decision is justified.
23
 This standard of proof sits between the higher 
criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt, and the lower civil standard of 
a balance of probabilities. Indeed, the DP(SO)A does not explicitly specify 
whether proceedings under the act are criminal or civil in nature. 
 
Since the decision in Thompson v R
24
 the imposition of an indefinite prison 
sentence for a criminal offence has only been sanctioned following the 
reception of ‘adequate and complete’
25
 psychological reports, and the 
DP(SO)A appears to have been drafted in consideration of this rule. Should 
the court be satisfied after a preliminary hearing that there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that the prisoner would represent a serious danger to 
the community in the absence of a detention or supervision order, it may 
make a risk assessment order.
26
 Such an order authorises the examination of 
the prisoner by two psychiatrists,
27
 and each must submit a report indicating 
their ‘assessment of the level of risk that the prisoner will commit another 
serious sexual offence – i) if released from custody; or, ii) if released from 
custody without a supervision order being made’.
28
 The report must also 
contain the reasons for the psychiatrist’s assessment.
29
 
 
To assist the court in making its final determination, the DP(SO)A outlines in 
section 13(4) the evidence to which the court must have regard. This includes 
the risk assessment reports prepared by the two psychiatrists, as well as the 
extent to which the prisoner co-operated with the assessment process.
30
 The 
court must also have regard to any other medical, psychiatric, psychological 
or other assessment relating to the prisoner.
31
 Furthermore, the court must 
consider any evidence of the prisoner’s propensity to commit serious sexual 
offences in the future,
32
 whether a pattern exists in the prisoner’s offending 
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behaviour,
33
 the prisoner’s efforts to address the causes of their offending and 
their attendance at rehabilitation programs,
34
 whether their attendance at 
rehabilitation has had a positive effect upon the prisoner,
35
 the prisoner’s 
antecedents and criminal history,
36
 as well as any other relevant matter.
37
  
 
Regulating this evidence received under section 13(4) are the ‘ordinary rules 
of evidence … [that] apply to evidence given or called’ in proceedings under 
the Act.
38
 
 
The ‘paramount consideration’ for the court at all times during its 
deliberations must be the first object of the legislation, which, as stated 
above, is to ensure the adequate protection of the community.
39
 Although its 
second object is to facilitate the rehabilitation of the prisoner,
40
 and one of the 
purposes of a detention order is to allow a prisoner to receive treatment for 
his behaviours,
41
 the DP(SO)A does not expressly require that the interests of 
the prisoner be taken into account at any stage during the application process. 
Should the court order that a prisoner be detained beyond the expiration of 
their sentence, it must review the order annually,
42
 or upon application with 
leave by the prisoner.
43
 This is the only measure in place to safeguard the 
prisoner’s access to liberty should a detention order be made against them. 
 
B Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) and the 
Constitutionality of the DP(SO)A 
 
The High Court declared the DP(SO)A constitutionally valid in Fardon v 
Attorney-General (Qld),
44
 deciding that the Act did not empower the judges 
of the Queensland Supreme Court to perform a function incompatible with 
that court’s status as one vested with federal judicial power under Chapter III 
of the Australian Constitution.
45
  
                                                 
33
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It is a matter of concern that the judges failed to address, among other things, 
the DP(SO)A’s apparent inconsistency with precedent regarding the need for 
proportionate sentencing. However, their decision is, at least for the time 
being, final, and it is not the purpose of this outline to evaluate in any great 
detail the remarks of the majority judges. Therefore, merely a brief outline of 
those parts of the decision relevant to this article’s discussion of the Act’s 
operation is provided here. 
 
The system established by the DP(SO)A controversially assumes that 
psychiatrists can predict with relative precision and certainty a prisoner’s 
likelihood of re-offending. Chief Justice Gleeson dismissed concerns 
regarding the accuracy of such predictions, stating, ‘No doubt, predictions of 
future danger may be unreliable, but as the case in Veen shows, they may also 
be right’.
46
 Justice Gummow referred to McHugh J’s acknowledgment in 
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) that there are difficulties 
associated with the prediction of future dangerousness. However, he 
contended that, in the case of the DP(SO)A, these difficulties are overcome 
by the court’s mandatory consideration of psychiatric reports outlining the 
prisoner’s risk of further offending, the prisoner’s offending patterns, and the 
prisoner’s participation in rehabilitation programs.
47
 Only Kirby J, the sole 
dissenting judge, used the DP(SO)A’s dependence upon ‘notoriously 
unreliable’
48
 predictions of criminal dangerousness as a basis for holding that 
the Act requires the court to perform a function repugnant to the judicial 
process.   
 
Regarding the DP(SO)A’s procedures, of particular note was the opinion of 
all of the majority judges that the DP(SO)A confers upon the court ‘a 
substantial discretion’
49
 whether or not to make an order, should it determine 
the relevant standard of proof to have been met. In the event that the court 
does decide to make an order, it is presented with another discretionary 
decision, being whether to impose a supervision order or a detention order, 
and what the particulars thereof will be.
50
 Chief Justice Gleeson, McHugh J, 
and Callinan and Heydon JJ, also all confirmed that the rules of evidence are 
to apply to proceedings under the Act.
51
 These two points, as well as the fact 
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that the onus of proof lies with the Attorney-General,
52
 that annual reviews 
are undertaken into all detention orders,
53
 and that prisoners subject to orders 
are granted a right of appeal,
54
 were all reasons why it was decided by the 
majority that the judicial function established by the DP(SO)A is consistent 
with that traditionally performed by the judiciary. 
 
Although Gleeson CJ acknowledged that the DP(SO)A raises ‘[s]ubstantial 
questions of civil liberty’,
55
 he, along with the other majority justices, refused 
to entertain the notion that these questions were pertinent to the proceedings. 
This was because the case was ‘not concerned with those wider issues’.
56
 
According to Gleeson CJ, the politically controversial nature of the decisions 
that the Queensland Supreme Court is asked to make under the DP(SO)A 
does not render the Act inherently incompatible with the judicial process.
57
 
Justice McHugh concurred, arguing that legislation does not undermine the 
institutional integrity of the judiciary merely because it is offensive to the 
libertarian worldview, and should not be invalidated upon this basis.
58
 He, 
along with Callinan and Heydon JJ, also determined the object of the Act to 
be the protection of the community, and not the punishment of the prisoner, 
offering this as another characteristic in favour of the Act’s 
constitutionality.
59
 On the other hand, Kirby J was so concerned by the 
character of the legislation that he asked whether Australians have ‘debased 
liberty so far that deprivation of liberty, for yearly intervals, confined in a 
prison cell, is now regarded as immaterial or insignificant’.
60
  
 
C Post-Sentence Detention and Supervision 
Legislation in Other Australian Jurisdictions 
 
With the DP(SO)A constitutionally validated, Western Australia (WA) and 
New South Wales (NSW) followed Queensland’s lead and enacted laws 
which provide for the post-sentence detention and supervision of certain 
classes of offenders. Unsurprisingly, the WA and NSW Acts are materially 
very similar to the DP(SO)A, in many instances borrowing its exact language. 
However, legislative evolution is to be expected, and it is in the offences for 
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which a prisoner may be eligible for a post-sentence protection order 
application that the first notable deviations from the Queensland model can 
be identified. 
 
1 Western Australia 
 
Like the DP(SO)A, the Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA) (DSOA) 
applies to offenders serving terms of imprisonment for a serious sexual 
offence.
61
 Under WA law, a serious sexual offence is defined as being one for 
which the maximum penalty that may be imposed is at least seven years.
62
 
These include sexual offences against children under both the Criminal Code 
1913
63
 and Prostitution Act 2000 (WA),
64
 and other sexual offences 
contained within Division XXXI of the Criminal Code 1913, including 
offences involving penetration without consent,
65
 offences involving 
coercion
66
 or servitude,
67
 and offences against people who are mentally 
impaired.
68
 The DSOA is therefore broader in application than the DP(SO)A, 
as it includes amongst its eligible offences a number of sexual offences 
against adults where violence is not an element. 
 
2 New South Wales 
 
In enacting the Crimes (Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) (C(SSO)A), 
the NSW Parliament has adopted a scheme broader still, extending the 
criteria of eligibility beyond those prisoners serving terms of imprisonment 
for serious sexual offences, to also include those prisoners who are serving 
terms for offences of a sexual nature.
69
 Offences of a sexual nature include, 
but are not limited to, offences involving child prostitution and pornography, 
which carry prison terms of 7 to 14 years,
70
 as well as acts of indecency and 
indecent assault without aggravation, which carry prison terms of 18 months 
to 5 years.
71
 It is therefore possible under the C(SSO)A to be the subject of a 
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detention order, even if imprisoned for non-violent contact offences or non-
contact offences of a sexual nature against adults.  
 
In his second reading speech, the Hon Tony Kelly, NSW Minister for Justice, 
stated that the C(SSO)A  
 
relates to a handful of high-risk, hard-core offenders who have not made 
any attempt to rehabilitate whilst in prison. These offenders make up a very 
small percentage of the prison population, yet their behaviour poses a very 
real threat to the public.
72
    
 
He stated further that the Act’s definitions of what constitutes a ‘serious 
sexual offence’ and ‘offence of a sexual nature’ will ‘capture the worst sexual 
recidivists in our system’.
73
 Research suggests that non-contact sex offenders 
do have high rates of recidivism, but also that it is generally unlikely that 
their offending will escalate in character towards serious contact sex 
offences.
74
 It is therefore debatable whether the threat these offenders pose to 
the public is serious enough to warrant the imposition of a measure as 
extreme as a post-sentence indefinite detention order. 
 
3 Victoria 
 
Victoria’s post-sentence protection order regime at this point consists of the 
Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 (Vic) (SSOMA), which includes 
only the authorisation to make supervision orders. However, at the Attorney-
General’s request, the Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council (VSAC) 
recently considered whether the State should introduce post-sentence 
detention orders as well.
75
 Under the model considered by the VSAC in its 
Discussion Paper, Victorian prisoners would be eligible for post-sentence 
detention if they are serving a custodial sentence for any sexual offence 
against either a child or an adult. The model also included two further 
options, the first of which excluded all non-contact offences carrying a 
                                                 
72
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maximum penalty of less than 5 years, and the second of which included 
homicides with a sexual element or motivation.
76
 In comparative terms, 
replication of this model in legislation would mean that the Victorian scheme 
would not appear to be as broad in its application as the NSW Act, but still 
broader than the DP(SO)A.  
 
In its final report, the VSAC rejected the model considered in the Discussion 
Paper, and recommended against the introduction of post-sentence detention, 
suggesting that Victoria would be better served by reforms to the system of 
post-sentence supervision orders established by the SSOMA.
77
 This was not a 
unanimous view, but one held by a majority of VSAC members. The reason 
why the VSAC decided against recommending the introduction of post-
sentence detention orders was that it believed any potential benefits to be 
gained by such a measure would be outweighed by its dangers.
78
 In 
particular, the VSAC was concerned about the accuracy of the predictions of 
risk upon which the orders would be based, and was sceptical of the 
effectiveness of post-sentence detention schemes in reducing sex offending, 
citing the lack of available research in this area.
79
 The VSAC also argued that 
post-sentence detention schemes have the potential to ‘unjustifiably … limit 
human rights and due process’,
80
 and maintained that there are more cost-
effective ways to address the risk sex offenders pose to the community.
81
  
 
Although the VSAC decided not to support the introduction of post-sentence 
detention legislation, it made numerous recommendations as to how such a 
scheme should be structured if one were to be introduced. In response to the 
VSAC’s final report, the Victorian Government has confirmed that it intends 
to continue with its plans to enact a post-sentence detention order regime. In 
the meantime, the Government has recently broadened the application of the 
SSOMA to include sex offenders whose crimes were committed against 
adults, but it still intends to introduce the Serious Sex Offenders (Detention 
and Supervision) Bill at some point during 2008.
82
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While it remains to be seen what form the new legislation will take, a 
spokesperson for the Attorney-General, Rob Hulls, stated that ‘[t]he 
Sentencing Advisory Council has made a number of safeguards to prevent 
abuse of the system’, and that the ‘Government is going to be giving this 
careful consideration’.
83
 More recently the Victorian Corrections Minister, 
Bob Cameron, has stated that ‘[t]he new scheme will draw on the Sentencing 
Advisory Council’s recommendations in its final report to Government … 
and by [sic] what has been learnt from the operation of existing schemes’.
84
  
 
III JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF EXPERT PSYCHIATRIC 
EVIDENCE UNDER THE DP(SO)A 
 
In proceedings under the DP(SO)A, judges are required to refer to a number 
of evidentiary factors, contained in section 13(4), and outlined in Part II.A 
above. Amongst these factors are the risk assessment reports of two 
psychiatrists,
85
 and any other psychiatric or psychological reports that are 
available.
86
 This is the most critical evidence for judges when determining 
whether a prisoner poses an unacceptable risk of re-offending if released 
without supervision. However, the system’s reliance upon this evidence, and 
the question of whether this evidence is admissible, has been particularly 
controversial.  
 
This Part explores the admissibility of expert psychiatric risk assessments by 
reference to the main rules of expert evidence, which apply to proceedings 
under the Act. Part III.C.1 asks whether there is an area of expertise 
regarding predictions of re-offending, Part III.C.2 asks what qualifies a 
witness in the area of expertise, Part III.C.3 asks whether the basis for the 
expert opinion been established, and Part III.C.4 asks whether the evidence 
addresses the ultimate issue. Part III.D briefly touches on the issue of biased 
witnesses. These Parts also identify and analyse the way in which judges 
have applied these rules, and treated this evidence when handing down their 
judgments. 
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A What is Expert Evidence? 
 
Within the law of evidence there exists a general rule ‘that it is for the court 
and not the witness to draw inferences of fact from primary, observed 
facts’.
87
 On the other hand, expert witnesses are permitted to provide the 
court with their opinions in situations where ‘inexperienced persons are 
unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment … without such 
assistance’,
 88
 and the witness has expertise in making inferences in a 
recognised area of expert knowledge. The purpose of such evidence, 
according to Lord President Cooper in Davie v Edinburgh Magistrates,
89
  
 
is to furnish the judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for 
testing the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the judge or jury to 
form their own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to 
the facts proved in evidence.
90
 
 
Despite the ever increasing importance of expert witnesses, particularly in 
relation to forensic psychiatry and psychology, there is a tendency within the 
legal profession and the broader community to perceive them as witnesses 
who will provide favourable evidence to whichever side has commissioned 
their opinion. Therefore, while psychiatrists and psychologists have an 
invaluable role to play within the court system, the integrity of this system 
can only be maintained if their evidence is based on the results of 
psychological research and if their role is limited to that of consultants rather 
than advocates. This is as important for the integrity of the psychological 
professions as it is for the court system, and accordingly, the professions 
themselves have begun to develop guidelines relevant for their purposes.
91
 
While this is noteworthy, the balance of this Part will focus on the 
admissibility of the evidence that expert psychological witnesses may 
provide.      
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B Questions about the Admissibility of Expert 
Evidence under the DP(SO)A 
 
The successful operation of the DP(SO)A is premised on the reception of 
expert psychiatric evidence. However, some authors have expressed concerns 
about the admissibility of evidence the type required by the DP(SO)A. In an 
article published just prior to the Act’s introduction, David Ruschena argued 
that 
 
expert opinion evidence as to dangerousness involves predictions taken 
outside of the context in which the profession intends them to be made; 
requires normative comparisons which are neither articulated nor derived 
from the professions [sic] teachings; and fails to achieve the necessary 
accuracy. Therefore, such predictions fail to pass the relevant legal steps at 
virtually every step to admissibility.
92  
 
Following the High Court’s decision in Fardon, and with Ruschena’s 
comments in mind, Professor McSherry stated that ‘[c]ertainly, there is room 
for legal challenges to the admissibility of such evidence’.
93
 As the rules of 
evidence apply to proceedings under the DP(SO)A,
94
 and considering the 
status of expert psychiatric evidence within post-sentence detention schemes, 
it is important to address the concerns of these authors.  
 
C The Admissibility of Psychiatric Evidence under the 
DP(SO)A 
 
1 Is There an Area of Expertise regarding Predictions of 
Re-offending? 
 
(a) The Legal Tests for an Area of Expertise 
 
Since the 1980s, Australian courts have sought to restrict the areas of 
expertise from which expert evidence can be proffered to those which form 
‘part of a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently organised or 
recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience’.
95
 
According to Freckelton and Selby, when determining whether the evidence 
of an expert witness should be admitted or not, Australian courts appear to 
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favour the test taken from the American case Frye v United States,
96
 which 
asks whether the theory or technique relied upon by the witness is generally 
accepted within the field of endeavour to which it belongs.
97
 
 
While the High Court has yet to make an authoritative statement as to the 
status of the general acceptance test within the Australian context, in the 
United States, the Frye test has been replaced by that used in Daubert v 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.
98
 The Daubert test focuses upon the 
reliability of the theory or technique, in the sense of whether or not it can 
produce consistent results. This enables it to assess a broad variety of expert 
evidence, as opposed to the Frye test, which is most effective when assessing 
the admissibility of new scientific theories and techniques.  
 
In Australia, the courts have been on the whole unenthusiastic about the 
Daubert test. Their caution has been justified on the basis that the Daubert 
test was formulated following the introduction of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, which have reduced the comparative value of the American 
jurisprudence on this issue for Australian purposes. Furthermore, while the 
Frye test has been superseded in the United States, the principle it supported 
has not been expressly reversed, which means that the theoretical 
underpinnings for its use in Australia may well remain intact.
99
 For these 
reasons, the Daubert test has, for the most part, been distinguished from 
application in Australia.  
 
(b) The Psychiatric Assessment Methods, their Level of 
Acceptance and their Accuracy 
 
The three main methods that are used by psychiatrists and other mental health 
professionals to determine the likelihood of recidivism are clinical 
predictions of dangerousness, actuarial assessments of risk, and structured 
clinical judgments. 
 
Clinical predictions of dangerousness were, for many years, the standard 
practice for mental health professionals. Put very simply, the concept of 
dangerousness is used to describe the level of danger that an individual poses 
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to the community.
100
 Clinical predictions involve the unaided exercise of a 
professional’s clinical judgment, and are based upon the observation of and 
interaction with the subject. Despite the method’s orthodoxy, a number of 
studies published in the 1970s and 1980s questioned the ability of clinicians 
to make accurate predictions of dangerousness.
101
 More recently, Smallbone 
and Ransley have observed that ‘[t]he accuracy of clinical prediction, which 
relies solely on professional judgment, has at best proved to be only slightly 
better than chance’.
102
 While not the only factor, it was the unreliability of 
dangerousness which led primarily to the rise in popularity of risk 
assessments as the method of choice among mental health professionals.
103
  
 
Actuarial risk assessments work through analysis of an offender against a list 
of risk factors, resulting in a statistical impression of the offender’s risk of 
recidivating. The risk factors and their effect on the likelihood of recidivism 
are compiled through retrospective studies of known recidivist populations. 
Research regarding the accuracy of actuarial assessments suggests that they 
‘undoubtedly improve the consistency of risk assessment’,
104
 and are 10% 
more accurate than clinical predictions.
105
 One of the more common actuarial 
instruments is the Static-99, which was found in a Canadian study to predict 
sexual recidivism accurately in 71% of cases, and violent recidivism in 69% 
of cases.
106
 These percentages represent the ‘probability that a randomly 
selected recidivist would have a more deviant score than a randomly selected 
nonrecidivist’,
107
 thereby measuring their likelihood of re-offending.  
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While actuarial assessments of risk are, on the whole, more reliable than 
clinical predictions, they have been criticised for their inflexibility. This 
inflexibility is caused particularly by their focus on historical factors, such as 
whether the offender was abused as a child, which remain static even though 
an offender’s circumstances will change with time. For example, according to 
Dolan and Doyle, 
 
[i]t is possible that historical/static variables may be relatively good 
predictors of violent recidivism in subjects with personality disorder, but 
clinical and risk management variables may be better predictors in 
populations with schizophrenia.
108
  
 
Structured clinical judgments are a combination of clinical and actuarial 
approaches, and ‘promote systematic data collection based on scientific 
knowledge, yet allow flexibility in the assessment process’.
109
 One such 
instrument is the Sexual Violence Risk Assessment Scheme (SVR-20), which 
was found in a retrospective study, based on a Dutch sample, to be 
‘significantly more accurate in predicting sexual recidivism than the Static-99 
risk category’.
110
 In fact, the accuracy of the SVR-20 was reportedly 83%,
111
 
which is remarkably high by comparison with other instruments. The most 
recently developed instrument is the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol 
(RSVP), which closely resembles the SVR-20, except that it incorporates 
guidelines on risk formulation.
112
 Unfortunately, no studies regarding the 
accuracy of the RSVP could be located, but one reviewer of the technique 
wrote that ‘it would not seem sensible to use the SVR-20 now that the RSVP 
is available’.
113
  
 
(c) The Admissibility of the Psychiatric Assessment 
Methods 
 
The High Court has deemed it appropriate for the results of the psychiatric 
assessment methods to be received into evidence, Stephen J stating in Veen v 
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R
114
 that if predictions of recidivism ‘are to be employed as aids in 
sentencing, they should at least be the result of thorough psychiatric 
investigation and assessment by experts possessing undoubted qualifications 
for the task’.
115
 However, Stephen J also acknowledged that  
 
[p]redictions as to future violence, even when based upon extensive clinical 
investigation by teams of experienced psychiatrists, have … been 
condemned as prone to very significant degrees of error when matched 
against actuality.
116 
 
Despite this acknowledgment, the High Court has yet to undertake any 
critical evaluation of these methods against either the general acceptance or 
reliability tests. This is troubling, because while these methods may be 
generally accepted among mental health professionals, it is for a purpose 
different from the one for which they are usually employed within the 
criminal justice system.  
 
In predicting the likelihood of recidivism, the primary design purpose of the 
three methods outlined above is to assist mental health professionals in 
reducing the potential for harm by enabling them to identify offenders 
susceptible to recidivism and develop targeted treatment strategies.
117
 
However, these methods have also come to be generally accepted and relied 
upon by the Australian criminal justice system as a sentencing aid. The main 
difference in the medical and forensic uses of these methods is the degree of 
certainty that each field normally requires. Whereas medical treatment seems 
acceptable, and even desirable, when the predictions are far from certain, 
interventions by the criminal justice system would normally require a much 
higher level of certainty. Therefore, one problem is that methods which were 
not required to have a high degree of certainty are now routinely deployed in 
an area where such a degree of certainty is always required.  
 
As was shown in the previous part, the assessment methods are far from 
100% accurate, and while their accuracy seems to be improving, it is highly 
unlikely that they will ever be infallible. Although it may be that a success 
rate of 70-85% does equate to the high degree of probability required by the 
DP(SO)A, it would be harder to sustain an argument that such a success rate 
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could justify a decision on the basis of certainty beyond reasonable doubt.
118
 
Therefore, as was asked by Anthony Gray, is there no other reason than one 
of mere utility that the lower degree of certainty is sufficient to extend a 
prisoner’s incarceration, when, to imprison the person in the first place, the 
court must be satisfied to the higher standard?
119
 
 
(d) The Assessing Psychiatrists’ Views Regarding the 
Accuracy of the Assessment Methods 
 
In presenting expert evidence to proceedings under the DP(SO)A, the 
psychiatrists have taken great care to ensure that the court is under no illusion 
as to the accuracy of their assessment methods. For example, in handing 
down the first detention order against Robert Fardon, White J stated that   
 
[b]oth Dr Moyle and Professor Ogloff were careful to stress that present 
scientific tools did not permit a determination, with a reasonable degree of 
accuracy, of an individual’s likelihood of being violent or re-offending 
sexually. What has [sic] been developed and validated are risk assessment 
schemes principally in studies in Canada and the United Kingdom and used 
in Australia. Those familiar with both the schemes and the person under 
investigation and having the necessary skills are able to identify with ‘some 
degree of accuracy’ the category of risk into which the person is likely to 
fall.
120
 
 
Another example of such candour was from Professor Nurcombe, who 
assessed Darren Francis for the purposes of the detention order application 
against him. In his testimony to the court, Professor Nurcombe acknowledged 
that the instruments he had used were imperfect.
121
 Despite this, Byrne J 
granted the detention order against Francis, so that Francis could have the 
benefit of a specific treatment plan designed by Professor Nurcombe and the 
other psychiatrists.  
 
When his detention order was reviewed, Francis was again assessed by 
Professor Nurcombe. On this occasion, the professor 
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accepted that it was doubtful that the accuracy of prediction of sexual 
violence will ever exceed 50% notwithstanding improved research 
designs correcting flaws in earlier methodology … [He also] pointed 
out that the actuarial findings were Canadian in origin and involved 
mixed groups of child molesters and rapists. Therefore the validity of 
the findings for an Australian population and for sexual sadists was 
unknown.
122
 
 
Furthermore, Professor Nurcombe and the other assessing psychiatrists, Dr 
Moyle and Dr Hogan, all ‘accepted that predicting future violence by an 
individual was necessarily imprecise’, insofar as ‘[t]here was a tendency to 
overestimate it’
123
 on the part of the assessing psychiatrist. 
 
At the hearing for the first annual review of Fardon’s detention order, Dr 
Nielssen was called by Fardon to give evidence, and suggested that the 
assessment instruments used by the psychiatrists do not result in predictions 
of recidivism with ‘a high enough degree of probability to meet the standard 
of evidence required by the Act’.
124
 In Dr Nielssen’s opinion, the instruments 
‘were limited and rather inflexible’ and ‘he concluded that they were unable 
to predict the risk of re-offending to a high enough degree of probability to 
warrant preventative detention in the case of an individual’.
125
 Unfortunately 
for Fardon, Dr Nielssen was unsuccessful in persuading Moynihan J, who 
renewed the detention order, despite failing to address Dr Nielssen’s specific 
criticisms. 
 
(e) The Methods used by Psychiatrists when Assessing 
Prisoners for the Purposes of the DP(SO)A 
 
In Attorney-General v Van Dessel,
126
 White J quoted Professor Nurcombe, 
who stated that 
 
[t]he celebrated debate between those who advocate actuarial prediction and 
those who advocate clinical decision making has abated. It is generally 
conceded that it is as important to have knowledge of statistical base rates 
for particular sub-groups as it is to have thoughtful, well reasoned clinical 
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opinion about a particular case. Many established actuarial variables (e.g. 
the PCL-20) are ultimately based on clinical knowledge and expertise.
127
  
 
In accordance with this, the vast majority of risk assessments carried out 
under the DP(SO)A by psychiatrists have been based on a combination of all 
three major prediction methods. Importantly, the psychiatrists have generally 
employed multiple actuarial and structured clinical judgment instruments. On 
the other hand, the reports prepared by psychologists, other mental health 
professionals and social workers, and received into evidence under section 
13(4)(b), have consistently been based on clinical assessments alone.  
 
Another strategy employed by the psychiatrists has been generally to utilise 
particular instruments to isolate specific risks. For example, in order to 
determine the potential for violent recidivism, the experts have used the 
Historical/Clinical/Risk Management 20-Item; when testing for psychopothy 
within prisoners, the presence of which may impact the likelihood of 
recidivism, they have referred to the Psychopathy Checklist Revised; and 
when testing for potential sexual recidivism, it is the SVR-20 that is used.  
 
There can be no doubt that these two strategies of multi-instrumentation and 
targeted instrumentation have increased the reliability of the assessments. 
 
(f) Judicial Statements Regarding the Admissibility of the 
Psychiatric Assessments in DP(SO)A Proceedings 
 
While the psychiatrists have outlined flaws in the methodology, and 
shortcomings in the results, of their assessments, in most of the cases heard 
under the DP(SO)A, the admissibility of the evidence has not been 
questioned. This could well be because of the multi-instrumentation 
approach, seemingly adopted by most of the assessing psychiatrists. 
 
In her judgment against Fardon, White J upheld the admissibility of the 
psychiatric risk assessments as expert evidence by reference to the test from 
Bonython, stating that ‘[t]here is a recognised body of research and scholarly 
writing in the field of psychiatry concerning the risk of recidivism including 
of sexual offences’.
128
 This much cannot be questioned, and, since this 
endorsement, judges have often simply stated that they are satisfied that the 
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evidence before them is ‘cogent and acceptable’.
129
 One notable exception to 
this was Lyons J, who granted a detention order against Nigel Robinson and 
based it in part on the clinical prediction of Dr Kar. Justice Lyons noted that 
‘Dr Kar was prepared to categorise the respondent as a dangerous sexual 
psychopath without the use of any of the usual risk prediction instruments in 
coming to that conclusion’, but stated that ‘this [method] is accepted by other 
experts as a legitimate approach’.
130
 
 
Despite the general acceptance of the psychiatric methods, there have been a 
few occasions where judges have hinted at potential weaknesses in the 
admissibility of the risk assessments. For example, in Attorney-General for 
the State of Queensland v G,
131
 which concerned an originating application 
against the prisoner, the court was informed by Mrs Rowland, the examining 
psychologist, that ‘[t]he risk assessment was carried out by reference to 
guidelines which have not been verified as applicable in Australia although 
they are widely used’.
132
 While ‘Mrs Rowland explained that they were 
simply the best that was available’, in Fryberg J’s opinion this explanation 
was ‘not a very convincing foundation for their use’.
133
 As explained already 
in this Part, many of the assessment instruments have been developed 
through studies of Canadian and European sex offender populations. This 
being the case, verification is important because there may be variations 
between the social demographics and general characteristics of violent 
offender populations in different countries or places, which, unless identified, 
may lead to a method or instrument being implemented on the basis of false 
assumptions. This in turn would almost certainly lead to an increase in the 
inaccuracy of predictions made.  
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Despite his reservations, Fryberg J refrained from dismissing Mrs Rowland’s 
assessment, as her report ‘was in Court and cross-examining counsel could 
have referred to it had it been thought to contain anything of importance’.
134
 
The failure of respondent counsel to cross-examine the experts on the science 
underpinning their assessment methods was also evident in A-G for the State 
of Qld v Ward.
135
 In this case, Muir J granted a supervision order against 
Allan Ward, and stated that ‘[t]here was no challenge in cross-examination to 
the methodology employed by any of the psychiatrists and no doubt was cast 
on the substance of the professional opinions expressed’.
136
 According to 
Ruschena, ‘legal practitioners have failed to question the assumptions upon 
which opinions offered to a court are based, preferring instead to seek 
contrary opinions’,
137
 which could explain the broadly uncritical acceptance 
by both counsel and judges of the psychiatric evidence, in spite of its 
apparent flaws. 
 
Another case in which the judge questioned the admissibility of the 
assessment methods was Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v 
McLean,
138
 where Dutney J expressed his concern that actuarial instruments 
are biased against indigenous prisoners. This concern was based on evidence 
from Professor Nurcombe, who had stated that 
 
[i]t should be pointed out that the predictive statistics upon which the 
various actuarial instruments to be employed in this case rely are of 
unknown validity for Indigenous people. North American Indians and 
Indigenous Australians are raised in homes often affected by family 
instability, heavy parental alcohol intake, and domestic violence. In other 
words, the actuarial risk indices (such as SORAG, SVR-20 and PCL-R) 
may be biased against Indigenous people. Whether or not they are biased is 
not clear. Predictive risk-assessment tests are currently being developed in 
Canada for Indigenous people but they have not been fully tested. Whether 
instruments designed in Canada will be suitable for Indigenous Australians 
is a further question the answer to which will not be available before the 
next five to ten years. Until then, it must be conceded that one is forced to 
rely upon predictive instruments derived from generalised Canadian 
offender samples.
139
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For this reason, Dutney J based his conclusions on the psychiatrists’ clinical 
judgments alone,
140
 although he noted the difficulties in attempting such a 
severance, and accepted that actuarial ‘tests do play a part in the overall 
assessment of risk’.
141
 
 
2 What Qualifies a Witness in the Area of Expertise? 
 
In order to provide an expert opinion, a witness must possess a degree of 
specialised skill or experience commensurate with the status of an expert.
142
 
The DP(SO)A states only that each risk assessment report prepared under a 
risk assessment order must be prepared by ‘a person registered as a specialist 
registrant under the Medical Practitioners Registration Act 2001 in the 
specialty of psychiatry’.
143
 This appears to suggest that as long as they are a 
registered specialist, any psychiatrist will be considered competent to conduct 
risk assessments under the Act, regardless of their skill or experience in this 
specific field.  
 
In Part III.C.1(e) above it was mentioned that psychologists, as well as 
psychiatrists, have given evidence under the DP(SO)A. While psychologists 
are not permitted to prepare assessments the subject of risk assessment 
orders, they are permitted to give evidence for the purpose of originating 
applications and under section 13(4)(b), which requires the court to have 
regard to, among other things, any relevant psychological assessment relating 
to the prisoner.
144
  
 
The expertise rule was invoked in one of the first judgments handed down 
under the DP(SO)A. The judgment concerned an application for an interim 
detention order against Fardon, about whom two psychiatric reports had been 
prepared, including one by Dr Larder. Justice Atkinson refused to rely on the 
report prepared by Dr Larder, despite his specialist registration, stating that 
he ‘lacked previous experience in assessing the dangerousness of a prisoner 
and the potential for future offending of this type’, and that ‘the opinion 
                                                 
140
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expressed was outside his area of expertise’.
145
 Justice Atkinson still granted 
the order on the basis of the other evidence before him, but the exclusion of 
Dr Larder’s report was an early indication that judges were going to apply the 
expertise rule in proceedings under the DP(SO)A, and not necessarily accept 
specialist registration as a determinative indication of relevant expertise. 
However, the expertise of the assessing psychiatrists has not been an issue 
since this case. 
 
3 Has the Basis for the Expert Opinion been 
Established? 
 
The ‘basis rule’ provides that the facts upon which experts ‘base their 
opinions must be proved by admissible evidence’.
146
 This rule generally 
restricts experts from presenting an opinion to the court that has been 
formulated on the basis of material provided to them in hearsay, unless the 
material relied upon is  
 
information of the type which scientific experts of the relevant categories 
ordinarily treat as data on which they may rely in forming opinions and 
making decisions within the area of their expertise.
147
  
 
In other words, while experts cannot rely on hearsay evidence regarding the 
treatment history of a person they are testifying about unless other witnesses 
have given evidence regarding that history, they may provide opinions which 
have been formulated on the basis of data or models provided in, for 
example, authoritative publications. This exception would therefore include 
the assessment methods outlined above, and there is no suggestion from any 
party in any of publicly available judgments that these models are by their 
nature hearsay evidence.  
 
In A-G v Watego,
148
 the originating application against David Watego was 
denied by Muir J, as his Honour determined the evidence from Dr Kar and 
Ms Skye to be inadmissible by reference to the basis rule.
149
 This case is 
particularly significant, as it appears to be the only case heard under the 
DP(SO)A where an application has failed as a result of the expert evidence 
being declared inadmissible.  
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When filing an originating application, the applicant must submit to the court 
any affidavits to be relied upon when seeking any preliminary, risk 
assessment, or interim orders.
150
 Section 7(1) of the DP(SO)A specifies that 
such affidavits ‘must be confined to the evidence the person making it could 
give if giving evidence orally’,
151
 which is an articulation of the ‘basis rule’. 
While Dr Kar did also interview Watego, his affidavit was based in part on 
various unidentified reports from other practitioners, and a package of 
material, the contents of which were also unidentified.
152
 Justice Muir opined 
that 
[t]o allow evidence of the nature of that contained in Dr Kar’s report, to use 
the words of Thomas J in Deputy Commission of Taxation v Ahern, “would 
virtually permit trial by assertion in circumstances where no real check was 
available upon facile or erroneous assertion”.
153
 
 
Ms Skye’s affidavit was based on exhibited reports that Muir J described as 
relying on ‘unproven hearsay evidence’.
154
 His Honour further stated that ‘it 
is impossible to establish whether the relevant opinions would have been 
formed if Ms Sky [sic] relied only on admissible evidence’.
155
  
 
Justice Muir’s reasoning was upheld on appeal, the Queensland Court of 
Appeal confirming that his Honour was entitled to declare the affidavits of 
both witnesses inadmissible,
156
 and reduce the weight accorded to Dr Kar’s 
oral evidence due to doubts about the doctor’s ability to distinguish between 
the hearsay evidence and his own assessment of Watego.
157
 The Watego 
decisions therefore suggest that it is unsatisfactory for experts providing 
psychiatric evidence under the DP(SO)A to rely solely on reports from other 
practitioners, or to make broad references to unspecified documentation even 
where an interview with the prisoner has been conducted. Unsurprisingly, 
establishing the basis of the expert opinion has not been in issue again since 
the Watego decisions.  
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4 Does the Evidence Address the Ultimate Issue? 
 
It is a long held principle of the law of evidence that ‘[i]t is not competent in 
any action for witnesses to express their opinion upon any of the issues, 
whether of fact or law, which the court or a jury has to determine’.
158
 In R v 
Palmer,
159
 Glass JA defined this rule as meaning that ‘[n]o evidence can be 
received upon any question, the answer to which involves the application of a 
legal standard’.
160
 While there are a number of rationales buttressing this rule, 
one of the most convincing is that expert comment upon the central or 
ultimate issue would usurp the essential function of the tribunal of fact.
161
 
 
The ultimate question that judges deliberating over DP(SO)A applications 
must answer is whether the prisoner is a serious danger to the community.
162
 
While the psychiatric reports prepared under risk assessment orders must 
indicate the level of risk that a prisoner may pose should he be released, or 
released without a supervision order,
163
 the psychiatrists are not required to 
comment on whether they believe this level of risk to be acceptable or not. 
The Act does not therefore appear to offend the ‘ultimate issue’ rule. In 
Attorney-General for the State Of Queensland v Sutherland,
164
 McMurdo J 
agreed with this interpretation, explaining that 
 
the assessment of what level of risk is unacceptable, or alternatively put, 
what order is necessary to ensure adequate protection of the community, is 
not a matter for psychiatric opinion. It is a matter for judicial determination, 
requiring a value judgement as to what risk should be accepted against the 
serious alternative of the deprivation of a person's liberty.
165
        
 
The Court of Appeal concurred, deciding in A-G (Qld) v Robinson
166
 that 
regardless of the recommendations of the psychiatrists, the discretion whether 
to make an order or not, and what exact order to make, lies with the judges.
167
  
                                                 
158
 Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 
378, 379 (Neville J). It is important to note that s 80 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) 
has abolished this rule, however the Act is yet to apply to either Queensland or 
Victoria.  
159
 [1981] 1 NSWLR 209. 
160
 Ibid 214.  
161
 See, eg, R v Ashcroft [1965] Qd R 81, 85 (Gibbs J). 
162
 DP(SO)A s 13. 
163
 DP(SO)A s 11(2)(a). 
164
 [2006] QSC 268 (Unreported, McMurdo J, 27 September 2006). 
165
 Ibid [30].  
166
 [2007] QCA 111 (Unreported, Keane, Holmes JJA and Douglas J, 5 April 2007). 
2008                                                              Post-Sentence Protection Legislation 161 
While the psychiatric evidence may not address the ‘ultimate issue’, its 
importance to judges sitting in DP(SO)A proceedings cannot be 
underestimated. This importance has been recognised by a number of the 
Supreme Court’s judges. For example, Mullins J described the evidence 
received in one case as ‘particularly helpful’.
168
 In Attorney-General for the 
State of Queensland v Waghorn, McMurdo J suggested that 
 
the most important evidence … was that of three psychiatrists each of 
whom also gave oral evidence … and ultimately the outcome turns upon the 
effect to be given to the psychiatric evidence.
169
  
 
In Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v Toms,
170
 Chesterman J 
characterised Dr Lawrence and Dr Grant as ‘both eminent forensic 
psychiatrists in whose opinions the Court is accustomed to place great 
confidence’.
171
 On the other hand, Moynihan J agreed that, on the whole, the 
psychiatric reports were ‘an important component’ of his evaluation, but 
maintained also that his ‘decision was based on the whole of the evidence’.
172
 
 
The obvious capacity of the experts and their evidence to influence judicial 
decision-making indicates the necessity for judges to remain vigilant in 
ensuring that these experts do not stray onto the ultimate issue. In New 
Zealand, where preventive detention has been in operation for some time, the 
potential for the witness to ‘prejudice the offender’s case or mislead the court 
about a psychiatrist’s ability to make valid predictions’ caused psychiatrists 
to decide ‘against addressing the issue of substantial risk directly’.
173
 Instead, 
most psychiatrists express their ‘opinion in terms of treatment needs and 
positive and negative prognostic factors’.
174
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 D The Problem of Biased Experts 
 
The analysis of available judgments made under the DP(SO)A has revealed 
that there is only a very small number of psychiatrists who give evidence to 
the court. In fact, the vast majority of the psychiatric evidence was prepared 
and delivered by only five different psychiatrists.
175
 While evidence was not 
supplied by this group exclusively, of the 85 times that psychiatrists provided 
evidence within the available judgments, these five psychiatrists were the 
source of this evidence a total of 67 times. Most of this evidence was in the 
form of reports prepared under risk assessment orders, although there were 
also occasions where these psychiatrists had prepared reports to be submitted 
with the originating application, or where reports prepared by these 
psychiatrists in the normal course of penal administration and prisoner 
treatment were submitted as evidence under section 13(4)(b). For example, 
the psychiatric evidence used by White J to help her determine that a 
detention order was appropriate for Fardon included a report from Professor 
James, who ‘had had previous dealings with the respondent at the request of 
Queensland Corrective Services’.
176
  
 
That there are a limited number of psychiatrists providing evidence could 
very well be because there are not many practitioners in Queensland with the 
necessary expertise. However, with so few experts conducting assessments, 
the effect of any actual or unconscious bias would be magnified throughout 
the relevant population of prisoners. While expert evidence presented by a 
biased witness may not necessarily be excluded under Australian law, the 
weight given to that evidence may be affected should the witness’s bias be 
demonstrated under cross-examination.
177
  
 
1 Actual Bias 
 
Actual bias could be a factor in the risk assessments of a psychiatrist if they 
possess pre-determined attitudes regarding a particular prisoner, or group of 
prisoners within the sex offender population. 
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As far as could be determined from the publicly available judgments, there 
has to this point been only one accusation of actual bias levelled at a 
psychiatrist who has presented evidence in a DP(SO)A related proceeding. 
This occurred during Fardon’s first annual detention order review, where it 
was argued by Fardon’s counsel that Dr Moyle, who had prepared a report 
for the review under a risk assessment order, had pre-determined views about 
the respondent, and had based his evidence on falsehoods.
178
 The accusation 
arose because Dr Moyle had also assessed Fardon before the first detention 
order was granted against him. However, as Fardon’s counsel could neither 
identify nor demonstrate the supposed falsehoods, Moynihan J rejected the 
argument.
179
 According to Moynihan J, the ‘fact that a witness has previously 
expressed a view adverse to the respondent does not justify a finding of 
bias’.
180
 
 
2 Unconscious Bias 
 
As stated by Walsh J in Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd v Overseas Tankship 
(UK) Ltd,
181
 while an expert’s evidence may have been prepared honestly and 
in good faith, it could also be ‘affected in greater or lesser degree by the kind 
of unconscious bias which is a well known characteristic of expert 
evidence’.
182
  
 
Unconscious bias can occur when ‘experts hold strong beliefs in theories or 
hypotheses about particular issues or subject matters and frequently do so 
from the purest and most altruistic of motives’.
183
 It can also occur as a result 
of an expert’s familiarity with the system, which can cause them to ‘become 
accustomed to focusing on a search for indicia of guilt’,
184
 or risk in the case 
of the DP(SO)A. Furthermore, an expert 
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may learn to adjust his or her testimony to accommodate potential 
problems, and may also learn how to present an aura of confidence and 
persuasiveness, in a way which will be dismissive of any challenge.
185
 
 
There is no suggestion in the judgments analysed that there are problems of 
this nature within the group of assessing psychiatrists.  
 
IV JUDICIAL BALANCING OF COMMUNITY PROTECTION AND 
LIBERTY UNDER THE DP(SO)A 
 
A The Pressure on Judges to Deny Prisoners their 
Liberty under the DP(SO)A 
 
The objects of the DP(SO)A are ‘to ensure adequate protection of the 
community’ and ‘to provide continuing control, care or treatment of a 
particular class of prisoner to facilitate their rehabilitation’.
186
 From the way 
these objects are framed, it appears as if the Act tries to balance the 
competing interests of the community on the one hand, and of the prisoner on 
the other. However, even though the Act authorises continued detention 
beyond the expiration of the prisoner’s sentence, its only explicit concession 
in favour of the prisoner’s liberty appears to be the annual reviews that must 
be conducted of all detention orders.
187
 Furthermore, the Act stipulates that 
the judge’s ‘paramount consideration’ when deciding whether or not to make 
an order against a prisoner ‘is to be the need to ensure adequate protection of 
the community’.
188
 It is this last direction that appears to tip the balance 
firmly in favour of community protection. In fact, when granting an interim 
detention order against Fardon, Mackenzie J declared that ‘[t]he legislation’s 
apparent intent is to subjugate the interests of the prisoner to the interest of 
the public’.
189
 
 
According to Anthony Gray, the practical effect of the DP(SO)A’s favouring 
of community protection is that ‘a court with doubts as to whether it should 
grant the application is encouraged to err on the side of caution’,
190
 and grant 
a detention order. As it is impossible ever to predict with absolute certainty 
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whether a prisoner will re-offend or not, it is inevitable that judges will be, at 
times, in a state of doubt when deciding whether to grant an order or not. 
Moreover, there is no way for a judge to guarantee absolutely that the 
community will be protected from a prisoner, other than by granting a 
detention order. Therefore, Gray’s presumption is by no means an 
unreasonable one.  
 
An added pressure upon judges to err on the side of community protection is 
the prospect of public criticism should they release a prisoner, who then re-
offends. Following the eventual release of Fardon, and his subsequent 
breaches of the supervision order imposed against him,
191
 as well as a parole 
order, Queensland Police Minister Judy Spence said that ‘she believed the 
court held a different view about allowing sex offenders into the community 
than the general public’.
192
 In response, Chief Justice Paul de Jersey of the 
Queensland Supreme Court was forced to make a statement defending the 
integrity of the Court. The Chief Justice expressed his belief that judges are 
not out of touch with respect to the community’s concerns regarding sex 
offenders, stating that 
 
judges accept, that these are areas of enormous concern to the community - 
community protection is the prime consideration in these cases … Judges 
are acutely alive, judges are members of the community of course, it's a 
fallacy to think that in some way they're separated from the communities, 
judges do their best to address these concerns … [W]e don't claim to be 
infallible but we've crafted a system to ensure if the judge does get it wrong 
then there's an avenue for correction on appeal.
193
 
 
The Chief Justice also said that the Fardon experience would influence judges 
to ‘contemplate a little longer’ over the decision whether to release prisoners 
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into the community.
194
 This comment acutely demonstrates the politicisation 
of the judiciary by the DP(SO)A, particularly when it is remembered that 
Fardon is not known to have committed any criminal offences while under 
the supervision order. 
 
Despite the pressure on judges to impose detention orders upon prisoners, 
and ‘although incapacitative policies may be popular with the public and 
governments, [research indicates that] a juridical tradition has developed 
which is generally resistant to such policies’.
195
 A study by Richardson and 
Freiberg focused on changes to the serious offender provisions within the 
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), designating community protection as the primary 
purpose for imposing a prison sentence upon a serious offender.
196
 It 
demonstrated that these changes had not resulted in significant numbers of 
sentences being imposed that were disproportionate in length to the gravity of 
the contemporary offence for which the offender was appearing.
197
 Whatever 
the reason for its results, this study provides cause to believe that if 
Queensland judges are at all like those from Victoria, then the pessimistic 
outlook expressed above on the way that judges may react to the pressures 
upon them when making orders under the DP(SO)A, could be ill founded.  
 
B Judicial Solutions to the Problem of Balancing 
Community Protection with Prisoners’ Liberty 
 
According to a representative of the Queensland Department of Justice 
interviewed on 12 July 2007, the Department’s records indicated that that at 
that time, 38 post-sentence orders had been granted against sex offenders in 
the fours years since the enactment of the DP(SO)A. These included eight 
detention orders and 30 supervision orders. Three of the detention orders 
were no longer being enforced due to either the offender’s death
198
 or the 
replacement of the detention order with a supervision order,
199
 and three 
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offenders had breached their supervision orders.
200
 The officer also stated that 
seven applications were currently before the court.  
 
A day later, on 13 July 2007, the Queensland Police Minister, Judy Spence, 
was quoted in The Australian as saying that at that time, 36 orders were in 
force, including nine detention orders and 27 supervision orders.
201
  
 
These figures accord roughly with those quoted by Chesterman J in Attorney-
General for the State of Queensland v Murry,
202
 which was heard in late May 
2007. In that case, Counsel for the Attorney-General informed his Honour 
that 23 supervision orders had been granted, and that four of these orders, not 
three as stated by the Department of Justice officer, had apparently been 
breached. However, Chesterman J was unequivocal in his statement that no 
offender was known to have re-offended sexually upon release under a 
supervision order.
203
  
 
While the Department of Justice officer spoken to could not say how many 
applications had been made in total under the DP(SO)A, the officer was 
aware that all prisoners the subject of applications had been found to pose a 
serious danger to the community. The few applications that had been rejected 
were done so on grounds other than the danger posed by the prisoner to the 
community.
204
 
 
The comparatively high number of supervision orders granted by the judges 
indicates that, despite the legal and political pressures upon them to impose 
detention orders, the judges have been somewhat uncomfortable with the 
prospect of denying prisoners their liberty post-sentence. In Attorney-General 
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for the State of Queensland v Toms,
205
 Chesterman J stated that ‘[i]t is no 
light thing to confine a man to prison for the whole of his life because he 
might re-offend’.
206
 From a legal perspective, this sentiment has been given 
effect by reference to the ‘jealousy with which the common law guards 
personal freedom’.
207
 According to Byrne J, 
 
[a]lthough the protection of the community is the ‘paramount’ 
consideration, it is not the only consideration. The other, the significance of 
which scarcely needs elaboration in this Court, relates to liberty of the 
citizen.
208
 
 
Furthermore, as ‘[a]dequate protection, not absolute protection is what is 
referred to’ by the Act,
209
 the Court of Appeal has stated definitively that 
there is no requirement that arrangements to prevent risk to the community 
‘must be “watertight”; otherwise [supervision] orders under s 13(5)(b) would 
never be made’.
210
 The effect of these developments appears to have been the 
alleviation of some of the perceived pressure upon judges from the Act to 
impose detention orders in borderline cases. 
 
In regard to the political pressure that judges face from the community, 
McMurdo J acknowledged in Attorney-General for the State Of Queensland v 
Sutherland
211
 that ‘[m]any in the community would say that adequate 
protection of the community requires the elimination of any risk of re-
offending’.
212
 In Murry, Chesterman J also remarked that ‘[o]ne hears, 
sometimes, and from some quarters, a suggestion that prisoners jailed for 
committing sexual offences, especially against children, should never be 
released’.
213
 In response to these concerns, Chesterman J stated, 
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The figures I was given do not support such a position. Only one in six 
(almost) of those released has not complied with the conditions imposed. 
Keeping six men in jail indefinitely after they have served their sentence, 
thereby destroying their lives, scarcely seems justified if only one of them 
might re-offend if released. The figures suggest that supervision orders are 
effective to prevent recidivism.
214
 
 
Not only was this conclusion supported by the information provided to 
Chesterman J in this case, that no prisoner released under a supervision order 
had been known to re-offend at that time,
215
 but according to Judy Spence, 
this information was still accurate as of 24 July 2007.
216
  
 
It is clear that, in most cases, judges have faith in the efficacy of supervision 
orders to achieve the objects of the Act, and prevent sexual recidivism. This 
was accepted by the applicant in Van Dessel, who conceded that should the 
prisoner be found to pose an unacceptable risk to the community, the making 
of a supervision order was the most likely outcome of the case.
217
 What is 
interesting, is that in a number of the more recent cases heard under the 
DP(SO)A, not only has respondent counsel been willing to concede that the 
prisoner would pose an unacceptable risk to the community if released 
without supervision,
218
 but the applicant has also decided against seeking a 
detention order.
219
 This indicates the development of a more co-operative and 
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therapeutic approach to the DP(SO)A trial process, perhaps based on the 
recognition that in many cases, far from being opposing, the interests of the 
community and the prisoner are inextricably linked.  
 
Also of significance in the development of this approach has been the 
inflexible nature of Queensland’s prisoner management policies. Due to the 
length of time that many prisoners have spent in prison, the assessing 
psychiatrists have sometimes been of the view that prison services have 
exhausted their capacity to assist in a prisoner’s rehabilitation, and that a 
graduated release plan would be the most appropriate course of action. The 
benefit of graduated release is that the prisoner ‘can gradually become used 
to having more freedom and more mobility and gradually interact with 
society and learn how to cope with the everyday requirements of living as a 
free person’.
220
 However, as prisoners subject to detention orders are 
generally ineligible for graduated release, the psychiatrists have often 
concluded that ongoing detention could in fact retard further progress. In 
these situations, judges have preferred the imposition of a supervision order. 
According to Lyons J, who rescinded Fardon’s detention order, 
 
[g]reater protection may be afforded by way of a graduated release but if 
adequate protection can still be ensured by way of a supervision order then 
that is all that is required to meet the requirements of the section.
221
 
 
While the therapeutic approach is of undoubted benefit to the prisoner, it 
should by no means be considered a ‘soft’ option. In granting a supervision 
order against Murry, Chesterman J estimated that  
 
[t]here is some risk that he will re-offend but the slightness of harm that 
would follow such re-offending may not pass the test. Nevertheless the 
imposition of a supervision order will remove, or substantially reduce, the 
risk and it is probably in the respondent’s own interest that such an order be 
made. As he himself has noted ‘every time he offends he is caught’. Given 
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his criminal history any offence is likely to result in a further term of 
imprisonment. It is best for all concerned if that is avoided.
222   
 
This passage demonstrates an example of the therapeutic approach resulting 
in the imposition of a supervision order where the prisoner may otherwise 
have been released unsupervised. Furthermore, it should be remembered that 
the terms of supervision orders are onerous by design.
223
 Should an offender 
breach any of these terms, the court may amend the supervision order, or 
rescind it and make a detention order in its place, thereby ensuring that the 
community is adequately protected.
224
 
 
In the wake of Fardon’s highly publicised supervision order breach, and the 
suspension of his supervision order by White J on 1 August 2007,
225
 the 
Queensland Parliament passed the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) 
Amendment Act 2007 (Qld) (DP(SO)AA). This Act makes it an offence to 
breach a provision of a supervision order without reasonable excuse, with a 
maximum penalty of two years imprisonment.
226
 The DP(SO)AA also 
empowers corrective services officers to make curfew and/or monitoring 
directions to prisoners released under supervision orders.
227
 Under a curfew 
direction, a prisoner must ‘remain at a stated place for stated periods’,
228
 
whereas under a monitoring direction, a prisoner must wear a stated device 
and/or ‘permit the installation of any device or equipment at the place where 
the released prisoner resides’.
229
 Although Judy Spence has said that 
‘supervision requirements, as they stood, were working’,
230
 these 
amendments suggest that the Queensland judiciary’s preference for 
supervision orders over detention orders in DP(SO)A cases, and its 
unwillingness to revoke supervision orders in the event of breach, have not 
pleased the Government.  
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V CONCLUSION 
 
This article has demonstrated that the way in which the Queensland judiciary 
has interpreted and applied the DP(SO)A has been very successful in 
achieving the Act’s stated objects, and particularly the ‘adequate protection 
of the community’.
231
 As outlined in Part IV.B above, only a small 
percentage of supervision orders have been breached, and no released 
prisoner is known to have committed a further serious sexual offence. As the 
Victorian Government has noted its intention to introduce post-sentence 
detention orders in spite of the VSAC’s recommendation against such 
reform, it is useful to conclude this article with a brief outline of some 
lessons from Queensland’s experience with its post-sentence protection order 
regime, and how these could be applied in the Victorian context. 
 
One of the reasons that the VSAC recommended against the introduction of 
post-sentence detention orders was its concern regarding the ability of mental 
health professionals to predict risk accurately. This article has confirmed 
those concerns as being reasonably based, but has also suggested that the 
implementation of multi-instrumentation and targeted instrumentation 
strategies by the psychiatrists, and the sensible application of the laws of 
expert evidence by the judiciary, have minimised the likelihood that 
inaccurate assessments have caused any significantly unjust outcomes in 
Queensland. For this reason, the VSAC’s recommendation that a panel be 
specially convened and charged with the responsibility for accrediting 
practitioners to undertake risk assessments and instituting model assessment 
guidelines should be seriously considered by the Victorian Government.
232
 
 
As mentioned in Part IV.B of this article, the psychiatrists assessing prisoners 
under the DP(SO)A have occasionally suggested that the most appropriate 
course of action would be a graduated release plan, an option which judges 
are currently not empowered to select. This appears to be a serious flaw in the 
Queensland system, and one with the potential to jeopardise community 
safety, irrespective of the success of supervision orders. The VSAC has 
proposed that any Victorian detention orders allow 
 
the offender to be detained or managed in the community … [and] 
expressly allow for the possibility of the offender being made subject to 
other less restrictive forms of control during the period of the order.
233
  
                                                 
231
 DP(SO)A s 3(a). 
232
 Sentencing Advisory Council, above n 19, 114. 
233
 Ibid 83. 
2008                                                              Post-Sentence Protection Legislation 173 
Considering the situation in Queensland, this seems to be an appropriately 
targeted proposal. 
 
In its Final Report, the VSAC expressed a preference for the revision of 
Victoria’s existing extended supervision scheme, rather than the introduction 
of detention orders for serious sex offenders.
234
 This accords with what has 
been shown to be the apparent tendency of Queensland judges towards the 
making of supervision orders, and there is nothing to suggest that Victorian 
judges would approach the exercise of their discretion any differently. The 
Queensland approach appears to have been remarkably successful, insofar as 
no prisoner has been known to re-offend upon release. This demonstrates that 
it may not always be necessary to apply draconian measures in order to 
achieve satisfactory law and order outcomes. However, criticism has 
remained regarding the strength of the supervision conditions imposed in a 
number of cases.  
 
Should the Victorian Government press ahead with plans to introduce post-
sentence detention, it must consider the Queensland experience and 
appreciate that detention orders are likely to be overshadowed in their use by 
supervision orders. It is therefore imperative that the Government ensure that 
any bill introduced into Parliament contains the supervision conditions 
necessary; not only to ensure that the community is adequately protected, but 
also to ease the community’s sense of fear. In any event, the judicial 
approach to the DP(SO)A outlined in this article should not be characterised 
as an exercise in resistance to, or obstruction of, legislative intent. To the 
contrary, the judges of the Queensland Supreme Court and Court of Appeal 
have used the DP(SO)A to provide the Australian people with a glimpse of a 
possible solution to one of the most emotive and pressing issues of the 
current day.  
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APPENDIX: PUBLICLY AVAILABLE JUDGEMENTS ANALYSED FOR 
THIS ARTICLE 
 
No Name Date Proceeding Judge/s Psychiatrist/s Outcome 
1. 
A-G v 
Fardon 
[2003] QSC 
200 
 
9 
July 
2003 
Challenge to 
constitutionality 
of  s 8 
Muir J N/A 
Challenge 
denied  
2. 
A-G (Qld) v 
Fardon 
[2003] QCA 
416 
23 
Sep 
2003 
Appeal against 
denial of 
challenge to 
constitutionality 
of s 8 
de Jersey CJ, 
McMurdo P 
and Williams 
JA 
N/A 
Appeal 
dismissed 
3. 
A-G v 
Fardon 
[2003] QSC 
331 
2 
Oct 
2003 
Originating 
application  
Atkinson J 
Dr Larder,  
Dr Moyle 
Interim 
detention order 
granted 
4. 
Attorney-
General v 
Fardon 
[2003] QSC 
379 
30 
Oct 
2003 
Determination 
of final orders 
White J 
As for #3, plus: 
Prof James,  
Dr Boettcher, 
Prof. Ogloff 
Detention order 
granted 
5. 
A-G v 
Watego 
[2003] QSC 
367 
31 
Oct 
2003 
Originating 
application  
Muir J Dr Kar 
Application 
dismissed 
6. 
A-G v Nash 
[2003] QSC 
377 
5 
Nov 
2003 
Originating 
application  
P D 
McMurdo J 
N/A 
Application 
dismissed 
7. 
A-G Qld v 
Watego 
[2003] QCA 
512 
17 
Nov 
2003 
Appeal against 
dismissal of 
originating 
application 
McPherson, 
Davies JJA 
and Mullins 
J 
N/A 
Appeal 
dismissed 
8. 
Welford, 
Attorney-
General v 
Francis 
[2004] QSC 
128 
5 
May 
2004 
Originating 
application 
Mackenzie J Dr Moyle 
Final 
determination 
adjourned 
9. 
Attorney-
General v W 
[2004] QSC 
262 
10 
Aug 
2004 
Originating 
application 
Douglas J Prof James 
Risk 
assessment and 
interim 
detention orders 
granted 
10. 
R J Welford, 
A-G for the 
State of Qld 
v Francis 
[2004] 
QSC 233 
13 
Aug 
2004 
Determination 
of final orders 
Byrne J 
Prof Nurcombe, 
Dr Lawrence 
Detention order 
granted 
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11. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Foy [2004] 
QSC 428 
30 
Nov 
2004 
Originating 
application 
Fryberg J 
Prof Nurcombe,  
Dr Lawrence 
Adjournment 
granted and 
application for 
interim 
detention order 
dismissed 
12. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v G QSC 
[2004] 442 
9 
Dec 
2004 
Originating 
application 
Fryberg J 
N/A (The 
applicant relied 
on evidence 
from 
psychologist 
Mrs Rowland) 
Application for 
interim 
detention order 
dismissed 
13. 
Attorney-
General v 
Foy [2005] 
QSC 001 
6 
Jan 
2005 
Determination 
of final orders 
Douglas J 
As for #11, 
plus: Dr Moyle 
 
Supervision 
order granted 
14. 
Rodney John 
Welford, 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Downs 
[2005] QSC 
016 
10 
Feb 
2005 
Determination 
of final orders 
Byrne J 
Prof Nurcombe, 
Dr Lawrence 
Dr Colls 
Supervision 
order granted 
15. 
Attorney-
General 
(Qld) v 
Pearce  
10 
Mar 
2005 
Originating 
application 
de Jersey CJ 
N/A (The 
applicant relied 
on evidence 
from 
psychologist 
Ms Smith) 
Risk 
assessment 
order granted 
16. 
Attorney-
General v G 
[2005] QSC 
071 
31 
Mar 
2005 
Determination 
of final orders 
McMurdo J 
Dr Moyle, 
Dr Lawrence 
Supervision 
order granted 
17. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Fardon 
[2005] QSC 
137 
11 
May 
2005 
Annual review 
of detention 
order 
Moynihan J 
Dr Moyle,  
Prof James 
Detention order 
renewed 
18. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Pearce 
[2005] QSC 
314 
16 
Aug 
2005 
Determination 
of final orders 
Atkinson J 
Dr Lawrence, 
Dr Moyle, 
Dr Colls 
 
Detention order 
granted 
19. 
Attorney-
General v 
Francis 
[2005] QSC 
381 
21 
Dec 
2005 
Annual review 
of detention 
order 
Mackenzie J 
Prof Nurcombe, 
Dr Moyle 
Detention order 
renewed 
            DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                           VOLUME 13 NO 1 176
20. 
Robert John 
Fardon v 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
and Anor 
[2006] QSC 
005 
27 
Jan 
2006 
Application for 
declarations and 
rescinding of 
detention order 
Philippides J 
 
N/A 
Application 
dismissed 
21. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v LBM 
[2006] QSC 
33 
6 
Feb 
2006 
Reasons for 
adjournment 
and interim 
order 
Jones J Unnamed 
Interim 
detention order 
22. 
Attorney-
General v 
Van Dessel 
[2006] QSC 
016 
10 
Feb 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
White J 
Dr Moyle, 
Dr Grant, 
Prof Nurcombe 
Supervision 
order granted 
23. 
Attorney-
General v 
Hansen 
[2006] QSC 
35 
6 
Mar 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
Mackenzie J 
Prof James, 
Dr Lawrence, 
Prof Nurcombe 
Supervision 
order granted 
24. 
The Director 
of Public 
Prosecutions 
v Foy [2006] 
QSC 045 
13 
Mar 
2006 
Application for 
revocation of 
bail 
Mackenzie J N/A 
Application 
dismissed 
25. 
Attorney-
General 
(Qld) v Yeo 
[2006] QSC 
063 
3 
Apr 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
Philippides J 
 
Dr Moyle, 
Dr Lawrence 
Detention order 
granted 
26. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Twigge 
[2006] QSC 
107 
17 
May 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
Mullins J 
Dr Moyle, 
Dr Grant 
Supervision 
order granted 
27. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v McLean 
[2006] QSC 
137 
17 
May 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
Dutney J 
Prof James, 
Dr Lawrence, 
Prof Nurcombe 
Supervision 
order granted 
28. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Bickle 
[2006] QSC 
130 
2 
June 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
Moynihan J 
Prof Nurcombe, 
Dr Grant, 
Dr Whitefoot 
Supervision 
order granted 
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29. 
Attorney 
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Friend 
[2006] QSC 
131 
2 
June 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
Moynihan J Unnamed 
Supervision 
order granted 
30. 
Attorney-
General v 
Foy [2006] 
QSC 143 
14 
June 
2006 
Application for 
rescinding of 
supervision 
order; or, 
amendment of 
supervision 
order  
McMurdo J 
Dr Lawrence, 
Prof Nurcombe 
Supervision 
order amended  
31. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Waghorn 
[2006] QSC 
171 
14 
July 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
McMurdo J 
Dr Lawrence, 
Dr Moyle, 
Prof Whitford 
Detention order 
granted 
32. 
Attorney-
General 
(Qld) v Van 
Dessel 
[2006] QCA 
285 
4 
Aug 
2006 
Appeal against 
indefinite term 
of supervision 
order 
Jerrard, 
Holmes JJA 
and 
MacKenzie J 
N/A Appeal allowed 
33. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v O’Rourke 
[2006] QSC 
196 
14 
Aug 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
Chesterman 
J 
Dr Lawrence, 
Prof James, 
Prof Nurcombe 
 
Supervision 
order granted 
34. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v B [2006] 
QSC 227 
28 
Aug 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
Lyons J 
Dr Grant, 
Dr Lawrence 
Supervision 
order granted 
35. 
Attorney-
General 
(QLD) v F 
[2006] QCA 
324 
30 
Aug 
2006 
Appeal against 
renewal of 
detention order 
Keane and 
Holmes JJA, 
and Dutney J 
N/A 
Appeal allowed 
and supervision 
order granted 
36. 
A-G (Qld) v 
Francis 
[2006] QCA 
372 
26 
Sep 
2006 
Further reasons 
for allowance 
of appeal 
Keane, 
Holmes JJA 
and Dutney J 
N/A 
Supervision 
order confirmed 
and amended 
37. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State Of 
Queensland 
v Sutherland 
[2006] QSC 
268 
27 
Sep 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
McMurdo J 
Dr Lawrence, 
Dr Beech, 
Prof James 
Supervision 
order granted 
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38. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Fardon 
[2006] QSC 
275 
27 
Sep 
2006 
Annual review 
of detention 
order 
Lyons J 
Dr Grant, 
Dr Moyle,  
Dr Nielssen 
Final 
determination 
adjourned 
39. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Toms 
[2006] QSC 
298 
20 
Oct 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
Chesterman 
J 
Dr Lawrence, 
Dr Grant 
Supervision 
order granted 
40. 
Attorney-
General 
(Qld) v. 
Beattie 
[2006] QSC 
322 
26 
Oct 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
Helman J 
Prof James,  
Dr Colls, 
Prof Nurcombe 
Final 
determination 
adjourned 
41. 
A-G (Qld) v 
Francis 
[2006] QCA 
425 
27 
Oct 
2006 
Application for 
costs order 
Keane, 
Holmes JJA 
and Dutney J 
N/A 
Application 
denied 
42. 
Attorney- 
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Robinson 
[2006] QSC 
328 
1 
Nov 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
Lyons J 
Dr Grant, 
Prof James, 
Dr Kar 
Detention order 
granted 
43. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Qld v B 
[2006] QSC 
330 
3 
Nov 
2006 
Originating 
application 
Douglas J 
Dr Grant, 
Dr Moyle 
 
Interim 
supervision 
order granted 
44. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Fardon 
[2006] QSC 
336 
8 
Nov 
2006 
Final 
determination 
of annual 
review of 
detention order 
Lyons J N/A 
Detention order 
rescinded and 
supervision 
order granted 
45. 
A-G (Qld) v 
Fardon 
[2006] QCA 
512 
4 
Dec 
2006 
Appeal against 
rescinding of 
detention order 
and granting of 
supervision 
order 
McMurdo P, 
Williams JA 
and White J 
 
N/A 
Appeal 
dismissed 
46. 
A-G v Wright 
[2006] QSC 
389 
15 
Dec 
2006 
Determination 
of final orders 
Skoien AJ 
Prof James, 
Prof Nurcombe, 
Dr Colls 
Supervision 
order granted 
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47. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Murry 
[2007] QSC 
036 
5 
Feb 
2007 
Originating 
application 
White J Prof James 
Unspecified 
interim order 
granted 
48. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v HTR 
[2007] QSC 
019 
9 
Feb 
2007 
Determination 
of final orders 
Lyons J 
Prof Nurcombe, 
Dr Beech 
Supervision 
order granted 
49. 
A-G for the 
State of Qld 
v Ward 
[2007] QSC 
033 
21 
Feb 
2007 
Determination 
of final orders 
Muir J 
Dr Beech, 
Dr Moyle, 
Prof Nurcombe 
Supervision 
order granted 
50. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Reynolds 
[2007] QSC 
52 
13 
Mar 
2007 
Determination 
of final orders 
Mullins J 
Prof James, 
Prof Nurcombe, 
Dr Lawence 
Supervision 
order granted 
51. 
A-G (Qld) v 
Beattie 
[2007] QCA 
96 
30 
Mar 
2007 
Appeal against 
detention order  
Keane and 
Holmes JJA 
and Douglas 
J 
N/A 
Appeal 
dismissed 
52. 
A-G (Qld) v 
Robinson 
[2007] QCA 
111 
5 
Apr 
2007 
Appeal against 
detention order 
Keane, 
Holmes JJA 
and Douglas 
J 
N/A 
Appeal 
dismissed 
53. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v Murry 
[2007] QSC 
121 
28 
May 
2007 
Determination 
of final orders 
Chesterman 
J 
Prof Nurcombe, 
Dr Beech, 
Prof James 
Supervision 
order granted 
54. 
Attorney-
General for 
the State of 
Queensland 
v. Foy [2007] 
QSC 141 
5 
June 
2007 
Application for 
amendment of 
supervision 
order 
Helman J 
Dr Wright 
Dr Lawrence 
Final 
determination 
adjourned 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
